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Tyler v. State 
PROSECUTORS BARRED 
FROM USING PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES TO EXCLUDE 
JURORS ON THE BASIS OF 
GENDER. 
In Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 
623 A.2d 648 (1993), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland precluded pros-
ecutors from using peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude jurors on the basis 
of gender. Through its ruling, the 
court extended the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which 
prohibited the peremptory striking of 
jurors based on race. Peremptory 
challenges are now permitted in a 
more limited capacity in Maryland 
than in federal courts. 
Jerry Samuel Tyler and Gerald 
Wynn Eiland were jointly charged 
and tried for murder in the Circuit 
Court for Prince George's County. 
At trial, defense counsel challenged 
the prosecution's use of peremptory 
strikes under Batson v. Kentucky. 
Counsel alleged that the prosecutor 
used these strikes to exclude jurors on 
the basis of race and gender. The 
prosecutor denied strikingjurors based 
upon their race but conceded that it 
had struck women because ofa belief 
that women could not act as impartial 
jurors. Thereupon, the Circuit Court 
for Prince George's County performed 
the Batson analysis only as to race, 
refusing to extend the protection to 
gender. 
Despite the adverse ruling, de-
fense counsel proffered a gender-based 
argument for the record. That posi-
tion was based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and Articles 24 and 46 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. The 
Circuit Court denied the defendant's 
Batson challenge as to race, and Tyler 
and Eiland were convicted of murder. 
Both defendants appealed to the 
court of special appeals where the 
cases were consolidated for purposes 
of the opinion. Absent such a ruling 
by the Supreme Court, the court of 
special appeals refused to extend 
Batson to gender-based strikes. Fur-
thermore, the court found no support 
for the gender-based interpretation in 
either Article 24 or Article 46 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland certi-
fied the case on the question of whether 
Maryland law prohibits the exercise 
of peremptory challenges to strike 
jurors on the basis of gender. The 
court began its analysis with a discus-
sion of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79 (1986), and its progeny. In Batson, 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that Equal Protection forbids 
prosecutors, during jury selection, 
from using peremptory strikes to ex-
clude jurors solely on the basis of their 
race.ld. at263, 623 A.2dat649. The 
court then looked at Hernandez v. 
New York, 500 U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 
1859 (1991), which announced a 
three-step process to evaluate Batson 
claims. This process requires the 
defendant to initially raise the issue 
and make aprimaJacie showing that 
the prosecutor challenged a juror solely 
because of race. Once this showing is 
made, the burden shifts to the pros-
ecution to provide a race-neutral rea-
son for striking the juror. Finally, the 
court must determine if the 
prosecutor's motive for dismissing 
the juror was racially discriminatory. 
Tyler, 330 Md. at 263-64, 623 A.2d 
at 650. 
Having set forth the applicable 
precedent, the court asserted that their 
applicability to peremptory challenges 
based on gender had not yet been 
determined. ld. at 264,623 A.2d at 
650. Citing Article 24 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights, the court 
found that Maryland law prohibits 
both racial and gender discrimina-
tion. The court further asserted that 
although the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights contains no express guaran-
tee of equal protection, it ls incorpo-
rated by the due process requirement 
of Article 24. ld. at 266,623 A.2d at 
650, citing Attorney General v. 
Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 
929 (1981). Furthermore, Article 46 
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights , 
also called the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, requires equality of rights for 
all Maryland citizens, regardless of 
gender. Thus, under Maryland law, 
gender-based discrimination in any 
form is "suspect." Tyler, 330 Md. at 
266, 623 A.2d at 651-52. 
Next, the court applied its analy-
sis of the state and federal law under 
Batson, to the problem of gender dis-
crimination. The court ruled that 
because Batson's holding was based 
on the theory that race is a "suspect 
classification," such strikes are sub-
ject to "strict scrutiny." Id There-
fore, since gender is a "suspect clas-
sification" under Maryland law, the 
court permitted Batson's requirement 
of strict scrutiny to be extended to 
strikes based upon gender. Id 
Finally, in applying its analysis to 
the case at bar, the court concluded 
that the trial court had erred by deny-
ing defense counsel the opportunity to 
litigate the use of peremptory strikes 
on the basis of gender. Id at 270, 623 
A.2d at 653. The court also ruled that 
Darby v. Cisneros 
COURTS ARE NOT FREE TO 
REQUIRE EXHA USTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IF IT IS NOT MAN-
DATED BY EITHER THE 
ENABLING STATUTE OR 
AGENCY RULES. 
the prosecutor should not be permit-
ted to attempt to propound a gender-
neutral explanation in any later pro-
ceeding. This peremption is based on 
the fact that the prosecution freely 
admitted, in the first trial, to exercis-
ing peremptory challenges to exclude 
women from the jury. Id at 271,623 
A.2d at 653. The court remanded to 
the case to the circuit court for a new 
trial. 
In Tyler v. State, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland expanded the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Batson v. 
Kentucky. The court re-examined the 
The Supreme Court of the United 
States resolved a conflict between the 
judicially created doctrine of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies and 
the statutory requirements of section 
lO(c) of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA") in Darby v. 
Cisneros, _ U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 2539 
(1993). The Court held that when the 
AP A applies, courts are not free to 
require exhaustion as a rule of judicial 
administration where the agency ac-
tion has already become final under 
section I o( c). 
Petitioner, R. Gordon Darby 
("Darby") was a South Carolina real 
estate developer who developed and 
managed multi-family rental projects. 
Darby worked with a mortgage 
banker, Lonnie Garvin, who devel-
oped a plan to permit multi-family 
developers to obtain single-family 
mortgage insurance from the respon-
dent, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development ("HUD"). 
Garvin's plan allowed Darby to avoid 
HUD's "Rule of Seven" which pre-
vented rental properties from receiv-
ing single family mortgage insurance 
if the mortgagor already had financial 
interests in seven or more similar rental 
properties in the same project or sub-
division. 
Darby obtained the financing for 
three separate multi-unit projects and 
although he successfully rented the 
units, a combination of factors forced 
him to default. As a result, HUD 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Batson framework and found that 
under Articles 24 and 46 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights, the pros-
ecution cannot peremptorily challenge 
jurors on the basis of gender. Al-
though the decision strips the pros-
ecution of broad discretion in jury 
selection, it heightens the State's ac-
countability to the defendant. More-
over, it encourages both women and 
men to serve on juries by discourag-
ing the use of traditional stereotypes 
about female and male jurors. 
-Kelly A. Casper 
acquired responsibility for the pay-
ment of over $6.6 million in insurance 
claims. 
In June of 1989, HUD issued a 
limited denial of participation prohib-
iting petitioners from taking part in 
any program in South Carolina ad-
ministered by respondent, Assistant 
Secretary of Housing, for one year. 
During a hearing on the consolidated 
appeals, an Administrative Law Judge 
issued an "Initial Decision and Or-
der" and found good cause to debar 
petitioners for a period of eighteen 
months. 
Neither petitioner nor respondent 
sought further administrative review 
although they were entitled to request 
a review by the Secretary according 
to 24 C.F.R. § 24.314(c) (1992). 
Instead, petitioners filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the 
District of South Carolina seeking an 
injunction or declaration that the ad-
ministrative sanctions were imposed 
for purposes of punishment in viola-
tion ofHUD's own debarment regu-
lations. The respondents moved to 
dismiss the complaint on the grounds 
that petitioners failed to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies. The district 
court denied respondents' motion to 
dismiss reasoning that the adminis-
trative remedy was inadequate. In a 
su bsequent opinion, the court granted 
petitioners' motion for summary 
judgement. 
On appeal by the respondents, 
